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Maroeconomic  Adjustment
and Growth
What role did public finance and trade policies  *  Indeed, using the exchange rate to
play in Chile's successful adjustment experience  stabilize a widely indebted economy not only
over the past 15 years? Vittorio Corbo draws  created a short-term real appreciation of the
these conclusions:  peso, but encouraged extemal borrowing at a
time when restrictions on capital inflows were
The reforms in its public finances helped  being lifted and intemational capital markets
Chile to reduce both the large public deficit and  were very liqui1.
the distortionary effects of taxes and revenues,
in this way creating basic preconditions for sus-  *  The jump in expenditures that followed
tainable growth..  Reducing the deficit required  the fall in interest rates and increase in capital
strong actions to decrease expenditures and  inflow caused the peso to appreciate further.
increase revenues.  Introducing a value-added  The result was an unsustainable current account
tax and adjusting the tariffs of public utilities to  deficit that ran close to 25 percent of GDP in the
reflect opportunity costs helped reduce the  first half of 1981.
deficit.  Structural reform of the tax system
helped reduce the distortionary effects of the tax  *  The appre iation squeezed tradables just
regime.  when exporters were making inroads into world
markets and when firms in the import-competing
Eliminating the large public deficit  sector had completed a major adjustment to
inherited from Allende's years was a major  trade liberalization. Not surprisingly, firrns in
contribution to the slow but steady reduction of  the tradable sectors suffered a squeeze on
inflation.  The reduction of inflation in tum  profits.
made the liberalization of trade sustainable and
supported the other microeconomic refrorms that  *  Once the macroeconoli,ic mistakes of
helped Chile to restore growth.  the late 1970s and early 1980s were corrected,
Chile recovered its growth and reduced inflation.
*  The recovery of the Chilean economy  This was achieved despite unfavorable tenns of
suffered a setback in the late 1970s. This was a  trade and a drastic reduction in the net transfer
consequence of the second stabilization attempt  of resources from the rest of the world.  Nontra-
rather than of the structural reforms underway.  ditional exports, in particular,  contributed
greatly to the dramatic recovery-assisted  by
*  The second stabilization attempt,  macroeconomic policies that supported real
undertaken in 1978, when inflation was down to  devaluation, kept inflation under control, and
35 percent a year-similar  to the average for the  reduced the unemployment rate to below 6
1960s-worked  at cross-purposes with the  percent.
export-led growth being generated by trade
liberalization.
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This  paper  analyzes  the  role  of public  finance  and trade  policies  in
the  adjustment  experience  of Chile  over  the  past fifteen  years. The  case  of
Chile  is  usually  cited  today  as an example  of successful  adjustment. Indeed,
in the  early  19709  Chile  faced  large  macroeconomic  disequilibria  and  major  and
widespread  microeconomic  distortions. Macroeconomic  disequilibria  were  mani-
fested  in  the form  of a large  and  unsustainable  current  account  deficit,  a
public  sector  deficit  of over 30  percent  of GDP,  and  an inflation  rate  of over
490  percent  per  year in spite  of  widespread  price  controls.
Microeconomic  distortions  were present  in the  form  of a  high level
and  a  high dispersion  of trade  tariffs,  interest  rate  controls,  setting  of
controlled  prices  of commodities  without  relation  to economic  costs,  credit
allocation,  wages  disassociated  from  marginal  product  conditions,  and
restrictions  to factor  mobility.
The  final  objective  of an adjustment  program  for  a situation  like  the
one that  Chile  faced  in the  early-1970s  is to reduce  inflation,  achieve  a sus-
tainable  current  account  deficit,  improve  resource  allocation,  move actual
output  close  to potential  output,  and achieve  a sustainable  and  acceptable
rate  of growth  of output  and  consumption  per capita. Here  there  is a  clear
issue  of sequence. A  change  in relative  prices  plays  a central  role  in  pro-
viding  the incentives  for  the  adjustment  to take  place. However,  the  infor-
mation  given  by relative  prices  is less  useful  in  a  situation  in  which
inflation  is  high and  unpredictable.  The sustainable  control  of inflation  is
therefore  a pre-condition  to successful  adjustment  and  should  take  precedence
in the  sequencing  of macroeconomic  adjustment  policies  (Corbo  and de  Melo,
1987;  Fischer,  1986;  Sachs,  1986).-2-
Both theory  and  practice  suggest  that  to stabilize  successfully,  in a
situation  in  which  monetization  is  directly  linked  to the  financing  of the
public  sector  deficit,  requires  a  credible  reduction  in the  public  sector
deficit. The level  of the  deficit  must be such  that  the  need for  monetary
extension  is  compatible  with the  growth  in the  demand  for  money  resulting  from
the  projected  output  growth  and  a projected  low  inflation.  Once  the  public
sector  deficit  has  been reduced  and inflation  has  declined,  it is then
possible  to concentrate  on the  other  components  of the  adjustment  program.
Therefore,  the  credible  reduction  of the  public  sector  deficit  that  Chile
undertook  begini-ng  in 1974  was an integral  component  of its  adjustment
program. Moreover,  due  to  high inertia,  in spite  of the  drastic  reduction  in
the  public  sector  deficit,  the  reduction  of inflation  was  a very slow  process
(Corbo  1985a). Once the  fiscal  situation  was under  control,  and  inflation
become  more predictable,  the  Chilean  authorities  started  to  make progress  in
the reduction  of  microeconomic  distortions,  including  the integration  of Chile
into  the  world  economy.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to first  review  the  Chilean  public
sector  and  trade  reforms,  and  then  to examine  their  role  in  the  economic
development  of Chile. The  paper  is divided  into  six  sections. After the
Introduction,  Section  II  presents  a brief  summary  of the  conditions  in 1973  on
the  eve  of the  shift  in Chilean  policy. Section  III focuses  on the  main
policy  reforms  introduced  by the  military  government  over  the  1973-82  period.
Section  IV looks  at the  public  finance  and  trade  reforms  in some  detail. The
effect  of the  reforms  on aggregate  incentives  and  on the  macroeconomic
adjustment  is the  subject  of Section  V.  Section  VI presents  the  main
conclusions. A chronology  of the  reforms  is found  in the  Appendix.II.  THE PRR-REFORM  PERIOD
Beginning  in  the  19309,  Chile  pursued  the  classic  strategy  of import
substitution  for  its  industrialization.  The  government  followed  a set  of
policies  designed  to shift  the  domestic  terms  of trade  in favor  of the  manu-
facturing  sector  at the  expense  of the  agricultural  and  mining  sectors. The
greatest  emphasis  was given  to  trade  policies  --  quotas,  tariffs  and an over-
valued  currency  --  all  of  which  discriminated  against  exports. From  1950  to
1970,  for  example,  the  effective  exchange  rate  for  manufacturing  was approxi-
mately  1.5  times  the rate  for  agriculture  and  almost  twice  that  for  mining.
The  bias against  exportables  within  these  sectors  was even  larger  (Behrman,
1976;  Corbo  and  Meller,  1981).
Up until  1955  the  trade  policies,  which  were enacted  mainly  as ad hoc
reactions  to balance  of payments  problems,  were highly  restrictive.  After
1955  these  policies  moved  cyclically,  switching  back  and forth  from  restric-
tive  to  more liberal,  but still  with tariff-induced  import  substitution  at
their  core. By 1970,  at the  end  of the  Frei  government,  the  economy  was at
the  stage  of  mild trade  liberalization.  (For  a review  of trade  policies  up to
the  late  1960s,  see  Corbo  and  Meller,  1981.)
The  structure  of the  effective  rates  of protection  urder  the  differ-
ent  trade  regimes  over  this  period,  in addition  to discriminating  against
exports,  was characterized  by considerable  variation  across  industries.  The
rates  ranged  from  1,140  percent  for  coal  and  petroleum  products  (an  import-
competing  sector),  to -20  percent  for  exports  in  the leather  and  leather
products  sector. Such  a range  could  hardly  be justified  by economic
arguments.-4-
The composition  of imports  during  the  19609  showed  the  effect  of this
system  of  protection: only  15 percent  of imports  were consumer  goods,  about
30 percent  were investment  goods,  and  55  percent  were intermediate  products.
As the  structure  of imports  moved  away  from  consumption  goods  toward  raw
materials,  parts  and  equipment  essential  to the  industrial  sector  and  without
close  domestic  substitutes,  the  Chilean  economy  became  more  vulnerable  to
fluctuations  in  the  world  economy. Furthermore,  the  import-substituting
strategy,  by protecting  capital-intensive  activities,  gave rise  to  only  a low
level  of labor  absorption. (For  details  on  Chile,  see  Corbo  and  Meller,  1981;
for  a comparative  study,  see  Krueger  et al.,  1981.)
There  were no  major  restrictions  on  capital  inflows  during  this
period,  although  outflows  were quite  controlled.  In retrospect,  the  inflows
in 1968  are  judged  to have  been  too  high in relation  to the  country's  needs
and  to  have contributed  to an unwanted  growth  in  the  money  base (Ffrench-
Davis,  1973,  p. 107).
By the  end  of the  19609,  GDP  was stagnant  while inflation  was running
around  30  percent  a  year  and  unemployment  around  6  percent. During  the  1960s
as a  whole,  GDP grew  at an average  rate  of only  4.2  percent  a  year,  a low
level  when compared  with the  6.4  percent  annual  growth  of other  upper  middle-
income  developing  countries  in the  same  time  frame  (World  Bank,  1983).
The  Frei  government  was succeeded  by the  Allende  government  in 1970.
During  the  three  years  of its  rule,  from  November  1970  to September  1973,  the
Allende  administration  tried  to implement  a radical  transformation.  Because
large  increases  in  expenditures  were  not  matched  by increases  in  government
revenues,  the  result  was a large  public  sector  deficit  that resulted  in  mone-
tary  expansion  and  a balance  of  payments  crisis. To suppress  the inflation
and  address  the  severe  balance  of  payments  crisis,  the  government  intensified
price  controls  and  trade  restrictions  across  the  economy. Control  of foreign-5-
trade  and  credit,  along  with commodity  rationing,  became  important  parts  of
the  macroeconomic  policy  of the  time.  The  banking  sector  was  lso
nationalized,  a radical  land  reform  program  disrupted  the  agricultural  sector,
and  the  most important  firms  in  manufacturing  were taken  over  by  workers
and/or  the  government.
By the  end  of 1973  the  Chilcpru  economy  was experiencing  substantial
macroeconomic  imbalances. Internal  ani  external  imbalances  resulted  from  a
public  sector  deficit  that  increased  from  6.7  percent  of GDP in  1970  to 30.5
percent  of GDP in 1973 (Table  2).  The internal  imbalance  led  to accelerating
inflation  efen  under  widespread  controls  and rationing. The  external  disequi-
librium  was temporarily  contained  by  widespread  restrictions  on foreign  trade
--  differentiated  tariffs,  multiple  exchange  rates,  and  extensive  quantitative
restrictions  on imports  and  exports. With controlled  interest  rates  that  were
negative  in real  terms,  organized  capital  markets  were almost  nonexistent.
When  price  controls  were lifted  in late  1973,  the rate  of inflation  was
roughly  1,000  percent  a year.
The  restrictions  on commodity  trade  were varied  and  considerable  by
the  end  of 1973 (Torres,  1982). Ad valorem  tariff  rates  ranged  from  0 percent
to 750  percent,  with a  mean  value  of 105  percent,  a  mode of 90 percent  and  a
median  of 80 percent. Among  4,952  tariff  positions,  187  contained  import
prohibitions.  For  the 2,872  tariff  positions,  a 90-day  non-interest-bearing
deposit  equal  to 10,000  percent  of the  CIF  value  was required,  and  for  2,278
tariff  positions  a  previous  approval  was  required  before  presenting  an import
request.
Exchange  rate  policies  were also  drastically  changed. During  the
Allende  regime  there  was  a shift  from  the  three  exchange  rates  of the  late
1960s  toward  one  with multiple  rates  for  commodity  trade. The  successful
crawling  peg  policy  that  had stabilized  the  real  exchange  rate  in second  halfof the  19606  was abandoned  in favor  of a fixed  nominal  exchange  rate. With
domestic  inflation  substantially  above  international  levels  and  with a growing
public  sector  deficit,  this  policy  could  only  be sustained  first  through  an
increasingly  restrictive  trade  regime,  and finally  through  a series  of major
devaluations.  The  culmination  of these  trends  came in  March 1973,  with a
crawling  peg system  for  one  of the  six  explicit  exchange  rates. Toward  the
end  of  Allende's  administration,  the  ratio  between  the  highest  and lowest
official  exchange  rate  was 52  to 1.  Not  surprisingly,  distortions  and rent-
seeking  activities  were  widespread.
The  domestic  comuodity  markets  were also  highly  regulated  by the  end
of the  Allende  regime,  with  more than  3,000  prices  being  set  by a government
regulatory  body,  the  Direccion  de Industria  y Comercio  (DIRINCO). The  labor
market  in the  organized  sector  was characterized  by low  mobility,  the  result
of large  severance  payments. The  government  was, directly  or indirectly,  a
major  employer.Itl. THE  MAIN  POLICY  REPORMS: 1973-821
The  military  government  that  took  power  in 1973  had to contend  with
an  economy  suffering  from  widespread  distortious  and  the  worst inflation  in
Chile's  history  (Table  1).  The  public  deficit  was close  to 30  percent  of GDP
and  net foreign  reserves  were  negative. Only  by virtue  of  widespread  price
controls  was inflation  kept even  moderately  in  check.  Indeed,  when the  new
government  lifted  the  price  controls  in late  1973,  inflation  skyrocketed  to
1,000  percent  on an annual  basis.
Given  this  situation,  the  military  government  spent  its  first  two
years  trying  to stabilize  the  economy. To eliminate  the  monetization  of the
public  sector  deficit,  it  introduced  a major  tax  reform  in 1974  and  imple-
mented  large  reductions  in government  expenditures  in  both 1974  and  1975.  It
also  sold  government  assets  inherited  from  the  Allende  years,  a step  that
further  reduced  the  need for  monetization  of the  public  sector  deficit. Good
prices  for  copper  in  1974  and  a rollover  of 30  percent  of the  outstanding  debt
service  in 1973  and  1974,  in addition  to the  above  measures,  eased  the  adjust-
ment to the  first  oil  shock.
The  government  also  lowered  the  nominal  tariffs  which  had ranged,  as
noted,  from  0  percent  to 750  percent  in the  Allende  years,  to a  maximum  rate
first  of 140  percent  and  then  120  percent. It also  lifted  all  commodity  price
controls  and  removed  the  constraints  on  domestic  interest  rates  by June 1975.
Following  a large  devaluation  in late  1973,  the  relative  incentives  for  the
1/  Much  has been  written  on the  Chilean  economic  experiment. See,  in  parti-
cular,  Corbo (1983,  1985a,  1985b  and  1986),  Edwards  and  Edwards  (1987);
Harberger  (1982  and  1985)  and  Zahler  (1983). This  section  draws  on material
from  Corbo  (1985b). For  a chronology  of these  reforms,  see  the  Appendix.a-
production  of exportable  goods  improved  substantially,  while  those  for  home
goods (highly-protected  and  nontradable)  and  import-competing  goods  were
reduced.
Still,  by late  1974  and  early  1975  an emerging  external  crisis  had
become  increasingly  appArent  --  copper  prices  dropped  almost  50  percent  with
respect  to their  1974  value,  while  the  price  of oil  stayed  at four  times  its
1973  value. These  exogenous  factors  forced  the  goverDnent  to  undertake  a
severe  austerity  program  and  a  major  devaluation.  Moreover,  in the  period
1975-79,  Chile  implemented  one  of the  most sweeping  programs  of reform  in its
economic  history. The  government  lifted  all remaining  quantitative  r  ic-
tions  on trade  and started  a trade  reform  that  reduced  the  tariffs  even  more
to a uniform  10  percent  by July  1979.  In addition,  in 1976  the  military
government  unified  Lhe  multiple  exchange  rate  system  and  instituted  a  crawling
peg targeted  to achieve  a fairly  stable  real  exchange  rate (with,  however,  two
revaluations  of 10 percent,  the  first  in  early  June  1976,  the  second  in  March
1977).
In two  areas  liberalization  was  much slower,  however. One  was labor
policy. Although  labor  markets  were deregulated  de facto  by the  lose  of trade
union  power  in the  year following  the  military  coup,  most  of the  restrictive
labor  legislation  inherited  from  previous  governments  was modified  only
slowly. There  was, nevertheless,  one  major  reform  which  was contrary  to the
thrust  of the  whole reform  program  --  a  compulsory  100  percent  backward  wage
indexation  was introduced  in  October  1974.2  (The  prices  of  many  nontradables,
such  as housing  rent,  school  fees,  mo-tgage  payments,  public  utility  tariffs
and  the  like,  had already  been fully  indexed  backward  for  some  time.) As is
2/ For  a review  of the  indexation,  see  A. Edwards  (1984).discussed  below,  this  was an  undesirable  development.  that finally  resulted  in
an  unsustainable  appreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate  and  a  macroeconomic
crisis. The second  area in  which  the  reform  effort  was slow  was the
liberalization  of capital  inflows. After  much fine-tuning,  important
liberalization  wvs intro,uced  only in  June  1979.3
In the  initial  years  of its  rule,  the  military  government  had
attacked  inflation  by controlling  the  growth  of  money. However,  in early
1977,  by  which  time  Chile's  economy  had  been significantly  opened  to trade,  a
debate  developed  within  the  government  on the  causes  of inflation  and  the  most
appropriate  way to deal  with it.  It  was that  debate  which  had led  to the  two
10 percent  revaluations,  which  were seen  as a  way of lowering  inflation  and
sterilizing  part  of the  accumulation  of reserves.
Toward  the  end  of 1977  the  government  announced  that  it  was going  to
tArget  the rate  of devaluation  to exceed  the  rate  of inflation  to compensate
the import-competing  sector  for  the  announced  tariff  reductions  (this  pre-
announced  devaluation  schedule  was called  the  tablita). In  February  1978,
Chile  established  an active  crawling  peg system  with an explicit  stabilization
objective. For  this  purpose,  the  rate  of crawl  was established  weli below  the
difference  between  domestic  and  foreign  inflation.
In  June 1979,  the  exchange  rate  was fixed  at 39  pesos  per  dollar,  at
the time  the  monthly  rate  of inflation  was about  2.5  percent,  substantially
above  the  international  level. Finally,  in late  1979  the  government  intro-
duced  a  new labor  code  that  re-established  collective  bargaining,  albeit  for
just  a fraction  of the  labor  force. It  mandated  that  the  lowest  offer
employers  could  make  had to equal  to the  previous  wage adjusted  by inflation
as  measured  by the  CPI.  This  measure  went  well beyond  the less  extensive
indexation  that  had  been instituted  in late  1974.
3/ See  Appendix  for  details.- J.U  -
From  1979  to 1982,  most  of the  poli;y  reforms  concentrated  on improv-
ing  the  functions  of domestic  commodity  markets  and  further  deregulation  of
capital  flows. One  of the  most important  institutional  reforms  was also  the
introduction of a private  pension system.- 11  -
IV.  PUBLIC FINANCE  AND  TRADE  POLICIES  IN  CHILE
Public  Finance  Policies
Prior  to  1975,  Chile  had  a  long  tradition  of  a  very  powerful  public
sector. Not  only  was the  public  sector  an important  generator  of employment
in the  general  government,  but  public  enterprises  were  well entrenched  in  the
productive  structure  of the  economy. The  structure  of the  tax  system  in this
period  was characterized  by  multiple  exceptional  regimes  with numerous  groups
receiving  special  treatment. Also,  the  presence  of an indirect  cascading  tax
system  gave important  incentives  to the  vertical  integration  of private  enter-
prises. Such  a system  proved  difficult  to administer  and  encouraged  evasion.
This section  will first  examine  the  behavior  of the  public  sector
budget,  using  available  information  for  the  1960s. 4 Over the  1960-69  period,
current  receipts  showed  an increasing  trend  with the  exception  of only  two
years,  1963  and 1964. While  revenues  represented  29.2  percent  of  GDP in 1960,
the same  ratio  reached  35.8  percent  in  1969. As a result  of changes  in
current  revenues  and  expenditures,  the  goverament  current  account  surplus  was
continuously  increasing  over  time.  In 1960,  the  surplus  was 4.3  percent  of
GDP  and reached  9  percent  by 1969.5  With respect  to public  investment
behavior,  there  was a declining  tendency  from  1965  onwards;  in 1966  public
4/ The  data  obtained  for  this  period  only  cover  general  government.  There  is  a
predominant  view  that  public  enterprises  were  a significant  burden  for  the
national  budget,  as  massive  subsidies  were given  through  government  pricing
policies. Transfers  were allocated  by the  general  government  for  the  finan-
cial support  of state-owned  firms. For  this  reason,  the  figures  presented
for  this  period  may underestimate  the  overall  imbalance  of the  broad
aggregates  of the  public  sector. Information  is extracted  from  Chilean
central  government  accounts;  World  Bank (1980,  p. 375).
5/ This  was due to rising  copper  prices,  the  creation  of indexation  for  tax
liabilities  to avoid  erosion  from  inflation,  and  a shorter  lag  in tax
collection. In addition,  some  tax  rates  were increased  and  new levels  were
introduced.- 12 -
investment  represented  8.5  percent  of GDP,  while  in 1969  it dropped  to 7 per-
cent.  In terms  of the  overall  surplus.  the  budget  showed  a persistent  deficit
over  the  entire  period,  oscillating  in its  size,  and  reaching  significant  mag-
nitudes  during  the second  half  of the  19609. Estimations  made for  that  period
show  that  the  deficit  fluctuated  between  5.5  percent  and 7.5  percent  of GDP.
The  difference  between  the  current  account  surplus  and  public  investment  is
accounted  for  mainly  by financial  investment.
Tax  receipts  represented  an increasing  proportion  of GDP  during  this
period,  with the  proportion  increasing  from  16.8  percent  to 18.2  percent.
This  evolution  is  explained  basically  by an  upward  trend  in the  indirect  taxa-
tion  ratio  that  grew  from  9.2  percent  in 1965  to 10.9  percent  in 1969.
During  the  Unidad  Popular  Sovernment  (1970-73),  profound  structural
reforms  were implemented. Expropriation  and  nationalization  affected  an
important  part  of the  productive  private  sector,  and  expansionary  aggregate
demand  policies  (higher  government  expenditures  and significant  monetary
growth)  were used  to achieve  the  administration's  proposed  objectives. The
public  sector  deficit  rapidly  reached  24.5  percent  and 30.5  percent  of GDP  in
1972  and 1973,  respectively;  and  the  annual  inflation  rate  ballooned  to
118  percent  and  488  percent,  for  the  same  years (Table  1).  Over  this  period
the  government  also  took  over  many  private  enterprises,  usually  following
labor  unrest. These  de facto  expropriations  created  a heavy  burden  on the
economy  in terms  of GDP  losses  resulting  from  the  expropriated  enterprises.
Severe  imbalances  were  widespread. Price  controls  were responsible  for
repressed  inflation,  and  major  distortions  in relative  prices  prevailed.
When the  military  took  power  in  September  1973  they  inherited  an
untenable  public  finance  situation  that  prompted  several  policy  measures
dealing  with both the  revenue  and  expenditure  side  of the  budget. On the  tax- 13  -
side,  the  first  measures  taken  involved  an  upward  adjustment  of property
values  and the  simultaneous  creation  of a one-time  net  wealth  tax.  Personal
income  tax  was made  more  progressive,  while  the  sales  tax,  the  most important
source  of indirect  taxes,  was also raised. Through  these  measures  the  govern-
ment obtained  additional  revenues  of 1.7  percent  of  GDP from  the  direct  taxes,
and  2.9  percent  from  the  indirect  taxes  (Table  2).  By the  end  of 1974  direct
taxation  accounted  for  35  percent  of tax  revenues.
In the  case  of indirect  taxes,  the  contribution  of international
trade  duties  increased  substantially,  even  though  the  average  tariff  applied
fell from  94 percent  by the  end  of 1973,  to 80  percent  at the  end  of 1974.
Trade  taxes  as a share  of GDP increased  a full  percentage  point  between  1973
and  1974 (Table  3).  This  increase  in  receipts  was the  consequence  of several
factors: the  elimination  of the  black  market;  the  large  real  devaluation  of
late  1973;  the  abolishment  of tariff  exemptions  for  public  agencies;  and,
improvement  in  tax  administration.
On the  revenue  side,  there  were generalized  adjustments  in the
tariffs  of public  enterprises  which  resulted  in almost  a 9  percent  of GDP
increase  in revenues  from  net sales  of goods  and  services  from  1973  to 1974
(Table  2).  Important  state-owned  companies  such  as  ENAP,  ENDESA,  and
CHILECTRA  multiplied  their  prices  in  real  terms  by  more than  900  percent. The
state  telephone  company  adjusted  its  real  prices  by over 100  percent  of their
1973 level. These  efforts  resulted  in the  elimination  of  massive  deficits  in
public  enterprises,  and the  establishment  of relative  prices  closer  to  oppor-
tunity  costs. Other  sources  of reduction  in fiscal  pressures  were the  priva-
tization  of an important  number  of firms,  as  well as the  elimination  of the
subsidies  to the  area  of social  ownership  (a  large  number  of firms  in the
manufacturing  sector  that  had  been taken  over  by the  government  during  the- 14 -
Allende  years),  which represented  savings  in expenditures  of 9.5  percent  of
GDP in 1974.
Turning  now to the  evolution  of the  main accounts  of the  general  gov-
ernment  (Table  3),  the  current  expenditures  which  had reached  33 percent  of
GDP in  1972,  were rapidly  adjusted  downwards  by almost  7  percent  of GDP  by the
end  of 1973. Wages  and  social  security  contributions  were the  central  vari-
ables  involved  in the  adjustment.  Together  they  were reduced  by  more than
9  percentage  points. There  is some  evidence  from  real  wages  and  employment
indicators  that  the reduction,  at least  in the  initial  stages,  basically  came
from  a contraction  in  earnings. Revenues  fell  in the  same  year  by almost
6  percent  of GDP. 6 This  was the  consequence  of the  operation  of the
Olivera-Tanzi  effect  in the  Chilean  economy. The  acceleration  of open infla-
tion  with the  lifting  of the  price  controls  significantly  contributed  to  the
erosion  of public  receipts. However,  the  net result  of these  policies  was a
reduction  in the  public  sector  deficit  from  30.5  percent  of  GDP in 1973  to
5.4  percent  of  GDP in 1974 (Table  2).
In contrast  to the  declining  current  government  expenditures,  and  the
necessity  of cutting  government  expenditures  for  stabilization  purposes,  pub-
lic  capital  formation  expenditure  increased  from  8.4  percent  to 12.5  percent
of GDP as shown  in  Table  1 for  1973-74. Accompanying  the  fiscal  contraction,
there  was a reduction  in the  flow  of internal  financing  to the  public  sector
from  30.4  percent  of  GDP in 1973  to  only  5.5  percent  of GDP  in 1974.  Since
non-monetary  financing  was  very small  most  of this reduction  was in  the form
of central  Bank  credit  to the  public  sector. As a result,  the  ratio  of
issuance  of high-powered  money  to  GDP fell  from  9.3  percent  in 1973  to 5.2
percent  in  1974.  In terms  of the  expansion  of the  credit  given  to the
6/ For  more details  about  general  government  accounts,  see  Larrain  (1988).- 15 -
public  sector,  there  were  major  reductions  in  nominal  growth,  although  the
monetary  base continued  to grow  at  nominal  rates  of  more than 300  percent
annually  (Corbo  1985b).
As part  of the  domestic  adjustment  to severe  external  shocks,  a
further  fiscal  adjustment  was initiated  in 1975. It included  severe  reduc-
tions  in current  government  outlays,  and  a 10  percent  temporary  jump  in income
and  property  taxes  and  exc.ise  taxes  on luxury  goods.
At the same  time,  a  major  fiscal  reform  was implemented  with the  pur-
pose  of geiierating  additional  resources  for  the  budget  and  reducing  the  rela-
tive  price  distortions  created  by the  tax  system. The  reform  incorporated  the
replacement  of the  old  cascading  sales  tax  by a  uniform  value  added  tax  of 20
percent;  the introduction  of full  inder.ation  of the  tax  system;  the  incorpora-
tion  in the  tax  base of the  undistributed  corporate  earnings;  the  elimination
of  preferential  treatments,  exemptions  and  taxes  on capital  gains;  the
increase  in road  tolls  and  petroleum  excises;  the  integration  of the  personal
and  business  income  tax;  the increase  of 10  percentage  points  in the  income
and  property  tax rates;  and,  a reassessment  of the  rural  and  urban  real  estate
values.
In addition  to raising  resources  and reducing  distortions,  these
reforms  were intended  to reduce  the  incentives  to evade  taxes  through  better
enforcement  and  the  elimination  of loopholes. Furthermore,  the  public  enter-
prises  continued  their  adjustment  with the  final  objective  of becoming  at
least  self-financing  and  eventually  profitable  through  the  improvements  in
operational  efficiency  and  price  corrections. In 1975  the  consolidated  public
budget  reached  an overall  deficit  of 2 percent  of  GDP (Table  2),  in spite  of a
serious  recession  in  which  GDP  fell  by  more than  12 percent  (Table  1).  There
were government  expenditure  items  which  increased  as a proportion  of GDP such- 16 -
as social  security  contributions,  transfers  to the  private  sector,  and
interest  on  public  debt.  These  increasing  expenditures  made the required
adjustment  even  more difficult,  as they  represented  an additional  disbursement
of 5.3  percentage  points  of GDP.  This  phenomenon  can  be explained  first  by
rigidities  in the  absolute  level  of social  security  payments  and  the  generali-
zation  of unemployment  benefits  as the  unemployment  rate  sharply  increased
during  the  recession;  and  second,  by  the  deregulation  of financial  markets
that  resulted  in a large  increase  in the  observed  interest  rate.
The  burden  of the  adjustment  on the  expenditure  side  was carried
mainly  by the  government  wage bill  as it  decreased  by 0.8  percent  of  GDP.  In
fact,  the  government  continued  its  policy  of personnel  reduction. Between
1973  and  mid-1977  nearly  100,000  public  employees  were fired. Public  invest-
ment fell  more than  3.4  percentage  points  of  GDP in 1975,  returning  to the
historical  levels  of  below  10  percent  of GDP (Table  2).  This  was the  conse-
quence  of  not only  the  stabilization  program,  but  also  of a deliberate  deci-
sion  taken  by the  government  authorities  that  the  private  sector  should  take
the  leadership  with respect  to the  expansion  of the  economy.
On the  revenue  side,  the  government  collected  further  funds,  measured
as a proportion  of GDP,  as a direct  result  of its  new tax  policy. A profound
deterioration  in the  terms  of trade  negatively  affected  the  resources  trans-
ferred  to the  consolidated  budget  by the  copper  enterprises. The  replacement
for  this loss  of revenue  came from  the increased  tax  burden  on the  private
sector  which resulted  from  the  tax  reform. In 1974,  the  current  revenues  of
the  general  government  represented  30  percent  of  GDP,  whereas  in 1975  this
ratio  grew  to 34.9  percent  of GDP (Table  3).  This  movement  is  explained  by
higher  revenues  relative  to GDP  obtained  from  property  and  income  taxes,  addi-
tional  resources  which  accounted  for  2.2  percent  of GDP.  At the  same  time- 17 -
further  resources  were also  collected  from  indirect  taxation. In total,  tax
collection  increased  more than  4  percentage  points  of GDP,  with most of this
change  explained  by the  introduction  of the  VAT  and  the  changes  in direct
taxation  implemented  as  part of the  stabilization  package  and the  tax  reform.
Further  achievements  in the  normalization  of public  finance  were made ini  1976
as the  chronic  deficit  of the  non-financial  public  sector  turned  into  a sur-
plus  of almost  4 percent  of GDP  for  the  first  time  in  decades. This time  the
contribution  to current  revenues  came  mainly  from  higher  non-tax  revenues  of
almost  5 percentage  points  of GDP (Table  2).
On the  expenditure  side  there  was overall  stability,  but  change  in
composition  across  different  items. Thus,  an additional  adjustment  took  place
in the  personnel  outlays  which  fell  from  14.8  percent  of GDP  in 1975  to
12.1  percent  of  GDP in 1976. At the  same  time,  associated  with the sharp
increase  in  unemployment,  the  increase  in the  payments  of unemployment
benefits  is reflected  in the  expansion  of the  transfers  and subsidies  to the
private  sector  observed  between  1975  and  1976  that  accounted  for  almost  2.3
percentage  points  of GDP.  There  was also  a downward  movement  in the  interest
payments  of the  public  debt.  However,  investment  behavior  was the  key for
explaining  the  overall  surplus  reached. The  government  decided  to reduce
investment  spending  by  more than  3  percentage  points,  falling  to levels  of
approximately  6 percent  of  GDP.
Nineteen  seventy-seven  was a recovery  year  for  the  economy. Current
revenues  of the  consolidated  budget  were similar  to those  of the  previous
year.  There  were some  changes  in  the  composition  of taxation  as direct  tax
revenues  diminished  from  9.6  percent  of GDP  in 1976  to 8  percent  of GDP  in
1977,  and  indirect  taxation  increased  from  14  percent  to 14.9  percent  of GDP.
The  downward  movement  in direct  taxation  is  explained  by decreasing  property- 18 _
tax  collection,  while  the  evolution  of indirect  taxation  was  mainly  influenced
by the  increase  in  international  trade  taxes  by more than  1  percentage  point.
Although  the  government  had undertaken  a generalized  tariff  reduction,  the
movement  in trade  tax  revenues  reflected  an increase  in the  import-to-GDP
ratio,  as the  economy  was  becoming  more  open  to foreign  trade. On the  expen-
diture  side,  the  wage bill  increased  from  12.1  percent  of GDP in 1976  to
15.8  percent  of GDP in 1977,  and  public  investment  showed  a recovery  to levels
near 7  percent  of  GDP.
Table  3 indicates  that  from  1977  until  1980  general  government  spend-
ing  showed  a decreasing  trend  from  33  percent  to 24.5  percent  of GDP,  reflect-
ing  an expenditure-cutting  policy  in  a  number  of areas. On the revenue  side,
indirect  taxation  became  increasingly  important. Property  taxes  declined  over
the  1977-80  period. The improvement  in  VAT administration  explained  its
increasing  significance  in  public  revenues. The  public  sector  surplus  was
largely  due to improved  public  savings  plus  curtailed  public  investments. The
first  was the  result  of the  policy  of reducing  the  size  of personnel  outlays
and  other  expenditures,  whereas  the  second  was the  consequence  of a deliberate
policy  of retrenchment.  In fact,  Table  2 shows  that  wage expenditures
declined  from.  15.8  percent  in 1977  to 13  percent  of GDP in 1980.
The  surplus  of the  public  companies  continued,  growing  with further
improvements  in  efficiency  and  higher  tariffs,  set  in  many  cases  according  to
the  marginal  cost  criterion. The  priority  given  to social  spending  in  con-
junction  with the  costs  of the  social  security  reform  accentuated  austerity.
In particular,  special  emphasis  was given  to restricting  the  level  of public
investment. In fact,  public  investment  fell  from  close  to 7  percent  in 1977
to 5  percent  of GDP  in 1981 (Table  2).  The intensity  of the  austerity  effort
of the  public  sector  can  be better  understood  when one  considers  that  during- 19  -
the  social  security  reform  the  public  sector  transferred  a large  portion  of
its  social  security  contributions  to the  private  sector,  as  many  workers  chose
to switch  to the  new capitalization  system. There  was a simultaneous  increase
in the  payment  of the  public  sector  by the  recognition  of  past contributions
of those  who changed  from  the  old  system  to the  new one.  Thus,  part of the
deterioration  in  the  public  sector  surplus  is  just  an accounting  device. The
government  stopped  collecting  social  security  taxes,  but at the  same  time
transferred  resources  to private  institutions  administering  pension  funds  to
cover  the  contributions  of the  people  that  changed  systems  and  also  stopped
acquiring  future  pension  liabilities.
As a consequence  of the  overvaluation  of the  peso and  of the  low
international  price  of copper,  in  1981  there  was a reduction  in re7enues  from
the  tax  on copper  that represented  2 percent  of  GDP (Table  3).  The  social
security  reform  enacted  in 1981  accounted  for  lower  contributions  to th?
public  sector  of 0.8  percent  of GDP.  However,  in terms  of expenditures,  even
though  wage expenses  continued  to  decrease  in  1981,  social  security  payments
went  up from  7.1  percent  to 8.2  percent,  as a result  of the  social  security
reform. At the  same  time,  the  subsidies  given  to the  private  sector  increased
from 4.1  percent  to 6.9  percent. Overall,  the  surplus  of the  public  sector
fell  to 0.8  percent  of  GDP (Table  2).
During  the  recession  of 1982,  there  was a severe  contraction  in
public  sector  revenues  in real  terms. Current  revenues  as proportion  of GDP
decreased  from  34.2  percent  of  GDP in 1981  to 33.9  percent  of GDP in  1982.
Although  the ratio  for  direct  taxes  remained  constant,  significant  fiscal
revenues  were lost  from  income  taxation. This  was off-set  by the lower
absolute  deterioration  in revenues  from  copper  taxes  than  in GDP,  thanks  to a
real  devaluation.  As a result,  the  absolute  loss  of direct  tax revenues  was
of the  same  magnitude  as the fall  in GDP.- 20 -
The revenues  from  indiract  taxation  were also  affected  sharply  by the
crisis. The  ratio  of indirect  taxes  levied  on goods  and services  to  GDP
remained  more or less  the same,  but  the  evidence  for  import  levies  revealed  a
contraction  higher  than  the  one for  GDP,  declining  from  2.3  percent  to 1.4
percent  of GDP (Table  3).  The severe  recession  of 1982  had a tremendous
negative  effect  on government  revenues. At the same  time,  the share  of cur-
rent  public  sector  expenditures  increased  almost  6 percentage  pcints  of GDP,
reflecting  to some  extent  the  presence  of downward  rigidity.
Interest  payments  in 1982  increased  because  of a pre-determined  level
of debt,  the  higher  interest  rates,  and  the  decline  in GDP (Table  2).  Sub-
sidies  increased  as a  proportion  of GDP  as they  were used  to compensate
several  sectors  negatively  affected  by the  crisis. The  wage bill  decreased  in
absolute  terms  by less  than  the  decline  in  GDP.  Relative  to  GDP it increased
from  11.8  percent  in 1981  to 12.2  percent  in  1982 (Table  2).  As expected,  the
pension  payments  went up and  contributions  went down  after  the  social  security
reform. Adding  the  surplus  generated  by the  new  pension  system  to the  overall
deficit  of the  public  sector  resulted  in an overall  deficit  of 0.7  percent  of
GDP  compared  to a true  public  deficit  of 3.4  percent.
Capital  formation  remAined  stable  in levels  that  bordered  5 percent
of GDP.  In 1983  the  revenue  generated  from  indirect  taxation  showed  a signif-
icant  recovery,  especially  in international  trade  as the  uniform  tariff  was
raised  in  June from  10 to 20  percent. Meanwhile,  income  tax  revenue
decreased. Further  adjustments  were applied  to the  earnings  of the  public
employees,  with the  wage bill  dropping  from  12.2  to 10.7  percent  of GDP.
Overall,  the  budget  showed  a deficit  of 3  percent  of  GDP.  The  surplus  coming
from  public  corporations  recovered  in this  period,  as a real  devaluation
generated  higher  benefits  for  the  companies  selling  tradable  goods.- 21 -
In 1984  the  government  initiated  another  fiscal  reform  effort. This
time  it focussed  on the  direct  tax  system. In  principle,  the  goal  was to
reduce  the  bias against  savings  that  results  from  a direct  tax  based  on
income. By applying  an approach  based  on the  taxation  of expenditures,  the
government  hoped  to increase  private  investment  and  savings. The  main
elements  of the  tax  reform  were: 7
- A gradual  reduction  was taken  in  the  marginal  rates  of the  per-
sonal  income  tax  as  well as an  enlargement  of the  marginal
income  within  a bracket. The  maximum  reduction  was implemented
in the  highest  bracket  of income;  the  marginal  rates  for  this
income  level  were reduced  from  58 to 50 percent. (Due  to a
poorer  fiscal  performance  than  expected,  restrictions,  an
important  part  of the  marginal  rates  reductions,  were not
implemented.)
- The  tax  base  for  income  was reduced  by allowing  a deduction  of
up to 20 percent  for  the  purchase  of stocks. This  deduction
could  not  be higher  than  20  percent  of the  tax  base.
- Measures  were taken  to eliminate  some  of the  discrimination
among  different  sources  of incomes.
- Only  distributed  profits  were  consideri'd  in the  income  base.
In 1984,  for  the  first  time  since  1981  the win-financial  public
sector  achieved  positive  savings  in its  current  account. There  were higher
revenues  in both  income  and  indirect  taxes. A  new  upward  adjustment  from  20
to 35  percent  in the  uniform  tariff  rate  was adopted. As a result,  revenues
7/  For a complete  description  of the  reforms,  aee  Marfan (1984).- 22 -
from  international  trade  taxes  increased  from  2.3  to 3.3  percent  of GDP
(Table  3).  Partly  reflecting  the  effects  of the  tax  reform,  indirect
taxation  showed  an expansionary  trend,  increasing  from  14.6  percent  of GDP in
1983  to 17.1  percent  in 1985. Non-tax  revenues  were stable  over the  period.
On the  expenditure  side  of the  non-financial  public  sector,  wages
and  salary  expenses  continued  their  contraction,  as they  declined  from  10.7
percent  to 9.7  percent  of GDP  over  the  1983-85  period. With the  exception  of
interest  payments,  other  major  current  expenditures  remained  more or less
stable.
Gradually,  the  government  began  to increase  the  share  of  public
investment  in  GDP,  while the  public  deficit  declined  from  1984  onwards  (Table
1).  In 1984  the  public  deficit  accounted  for  4.4  percent  of GDP;  by 1987
this  indicator  dropped  to 1.6  percent. This result  had  been possible  by the
means  of a  tremendous  savings  effort  made  by the  public  sector. Not  only
were general  government  expenditures  adjusted  in relation  with the  evolution
of the revenues,  but  public  enterprises  continued  to increase  their  operating
surpluses. In part,  this  reflected  the  positive  effect  of the  real
depreciation  on the  net revenue  of public  enterprises  in  tradeable  sectors
(especially  mining).
As noted  above,  fiscal  policy  had  been  extremely  austere  when  we
consider  the  significant  deficit  of the  public  sector  inherited  by the social
security  reform. One  of the  mQjt  dramatic  structural  adjustment  policies
undertaken  by the  Chilean  government  has  been  the  elimination  of the  public
sector  deficit. 8 This  was all  the  more impressive  since  tt  was accomplished
8/ One  need  to qualify  this  statement  by noting  that  in t}e  period  1984-86  the
Central  Bank incurred  large  quasi-fiscal  losses  as a result  of direct  support
to faltering  financial  institutions  and  from  exchange  rate  losses. However,
by 1987  most of these  losses  had  disappeared.- 23 -
at a time  when the  terms  of trade  losses  were significantly  affecting  govern-
ment revenues. Once  the  public  sector  deficit  had  been  eliminated  in 197,,
the  government  was  able  to embark  on other  reforms. In  particular,  it began
to reduce  the  severe  anti-erport  bias  of the  trade  regime  by reducing  the
level  and  dispersion  of tariffs  and  by lifting  quantitative  trade
restrictions.
Different  factors  contributed  to the  dramatic  turnaround  in the
public  sector  deficit. First,  the  introduction  of a VAT  system  that  resulted
in substantial  revenue  collection. Second,  an important  reduction  in the
losses  of public  enterprises.  Finally,  a large  reauction  in  the  wage bill
resulting  from reduction  in real  wages  and  a decrease  in  public  sector
employment.
International  Trade  Policies  During  the  1974-87  Period
Before  1973  the  use  of quantitative  restrictions  and  prohibitive
deposit  requirements  was  widespread. The  tariff  structure  ranged  from  0 to
750  percent,  with a  mean  value  of 105  percent,  a  mode of 90  percent  and  a
median  of 80 percent. Numerous  tariffs  positions  were subject  to  an import
deposit  of 10,000  percent  of the  CIF  value. Between  September  1973  and  July
1975,  the  maximum  nominal  tariff  was reduced  from  750  percent  to  120  percent,
while  the  weighted  average  dropped  from  105  to 57  percent. By early  1974  the
public  sector  was subjecL  to the  general  regime  of international  trade. In
August  1975  the  economic  authorities  proposed  a  new tentative  tariff
structure  with effective  tariff  rates  ranging  from  10 to 35  percent,  and  with
effective  protection  being  an increasing  function  of the  degree  of processing
of each  good.  The  trend  towards  trade  liberalization  continued  so that  by
1976  all  quantitative  restrictions  were  eliminated. In Septembe of the  same- 24 -
year,  prior  deposit  requirements  on imports,  excluding  cars  and  used
merchandise,  were removed. The  list  of  permitted  imports  was replaced  by a
short  list  of prohibitions.  The  proposed  structure  of tariffs  was reached  in
August  1977,  ahead  of the  original  schedule. During  this  period  the  mean
weighted  tariff  decreased  from  44  to 19.7  percent.
In  December  1977,  the  government  announced  its  intention  to achieve
a  uniform  tariff  of 10 percent  by June  1979. This  downward  adjustment  was
done  gradually  by  means  of small  monthly  adjustments  that  pushed  the  weighted
average  tariff  down from  19.7  percent  to 10.1  percent. By  June 1979  all
items,  with the  exception  of automobiles,  were subject  to a  nominal  tariff  of
10 percent. The  last  important  trade  liberalization  measure  of the  pre-
recession  period  was the  elimination  of the  list  of forbidden  imports.
Since  June  1979,  the  tariff  policy  was  modified  by compensatory
duties  applied  to countervail  foreign  dumping  policies  and  by changes  in  the
uniform  tariff  level. Surcharges  plus  the  tariff  could  not  exceed  35  per-
cent. This  policy,  established  in  November  1982,  affected  15  products  in
1982,  15 additional  ones  in 1983,  and  4  more in  1984. However,  by the  end  of
1986  only  16  products  were subject  to compensatory  duties.
From  1983  onwards,  several  changes  were introduced  to the  former
uniform  tariff  of 10 percent. In  June  1983  the  tariff  was increased  to 20
percent  as a response  to temporary  public  resource  needs. Later,  the  govern-
ment  permanently  set  the  tariff  level  at 20  percent.
In September  1984  a new  change  in  commercial  policy  was defined,
raising  the  uniform  tariff  from  20  percent  to 35  percent. Authorities  justi-
fied  the  policy  as  a  way of avoiding  a crisis  in the  external  and  public
accounts.- 25 -
In February  1985,  the  new  minister  of finance  announced  his inten-
tion  to adjust  the  level  of the  uniform  tariff  downward. Under  the  program.
it  was  proposed  that  the  uniform  tariff  reach  levels  of 30  percent  and  25
percent  in  the  first  semester  of 1985  and  1986,  respectively.  By  March  of
1985  the  tariff  level  reached  30  percent  and in  June  of the  same  year  a
further  reduction  to 20  percent  was taken,  not  only  surpassing  the  targeted
level  but  also  ahead  of schedule. Finally,  in  January  1988  the  level  of the
uniform  tariff  was further  reduced  to 15  percent.- 26 -
V.  THE  EFFECT  OF THE  REFORMS
What  was  the  effect  of these  macroeconomic  (fiscal,  monetary  and
exchange  rate  policies)  and  trade  policies  on the  evolution  of the  Chilean
economy? We will start  our  analysis  by examining  the  effects  of the  reforms
on the  evolution  of inflation  and  the  real  exchange  rate. The  former  is  a
key indicator  of  macro  stability  and  the  real  exchange  rate  has important
resource  allocation  effects.
As the  public  sector  deficit  began  to  be reduced,  the  need for
monetary  financing  slowed  down  and  so  did  inflation. The  relation  between
monetization  of a public  seccor  deficit  and  inflation  can  be obtained  by
examining  the  equilibrium  in the  money  market  (for  a recent  reference,  see
Dornbusch  and  de Pablo,  1988). Assuming  that  the  public  sector  deficit  is g
percent  of GDP  and  fully  monetized  the  increase  in the  supply  of  money is
(1)  h - g(ir)YP
where  Y is real  GDP,  r  is inflation,  P is the  price  level. Here  we assume
g  (r)  >  0  due  to the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect  (Olivera,  1967;  Tanzi,  1977).
Assum.ng  that  the  demand  for  money  is  given  by the  following  velocity
equation  V - a  +  pr  a,  p  >  0  and  assuming  monetary  equilibrium,  we obtain
(2)  MY,=  a  +  Pr.
Substituting  (2)  into (1)  and  -using  the  steady  state  relation  i - 9
- y,  where  d is  the  rate  of growth  of  money  and  y, the  rate  of growth  of real
GDP,  we finally  obtain
I  =  ag(r)y  stability  for  g(r)  =  g requires  1-pg>O. l-pg(r)
For  g(r)  =  g  we get  r  =  p  with inflation  an increasing  function a-rg
at an increasing  rate  of the  budget  deficit  to  GDP  ratio  (g).- 27 -
By using  this  model  we infer  that  as g decreased,  the  long-run
steady  state  rate  of inflation  decreased. However,  the  slowdown  of actual
inflation  was much slower  than  the  trajectory  for  the  steady  state  rate  of
inflation. Indeed,  by 1976,  while  the  public  sector  deficit  as a share  of
GDP  had  been reduced  from  a deficit  of 30.5  percent  in  1973  to a  surplus  of
3.9  percent,  inflation  was reduced  from  418.1  percent  per  year  in 1973  to
250.79  percent  per  year in 1976 (Table  1).
The slow  reduction  of inflation  can  be attributed  to strong  inertia
in  an economy  with  widespread  backward  indexation  of financial,  labor  and
commodity  contracts. Strong  evidence  on inertial  inflation  for  part  of this
period  is presented  in  Corbo  (1985a). There  is  much discussion  about  the
role  of  monetary  policy  during  this  period.
Harberger  (1982)  concludes  that  there  was  no monetary  crunch  to
force  a sharp  cut  in  money  supply  as a result  of  monetary  expansion  for
foreign  exchange  accumulation.  While  Edwards  and  Edwards  (1987)  conclude
that  there  was a policy  of tight  money (pp.  31-33). However,  the  sharp
increase  in real  interest  rates  and  the  decrease  in  Mla nd  while py  py
inflation  was being  reduced  provide  strong  evidence  that  monetary  policy  was
tight  (Table  4).
On the  real  side,  following  the  large  public  sector  adjustment  that
resulted  in  a reduction  in  the  public  sector  deficit  equal  to 25  percentage
points  of GDP, real  GDP  gr-owth  achieved  1.0  percent  following  a drop  of 5.6
percent  in 1973  (Table  1).
In late  1974  and  early  1975,  when international  capital  markets  were
practically  closed  for  Chile,  copper  prices  were cut  almost  in  half  and  the
price  of oil quadrupled.  The '.erms  of trade  loss  was substantial  and  as
neither  financing  nor foreign  reserves  were available,  there  was  no other- 28 -
option  but to  undertake  a radical  adjustment  program. The  real  exchange  rate
was devalued  a further  22.9  percent  in  1975  and  the  public  sector  achieved  a
surplus  equal  to 3.9  percent  of  GDP.
Because  of the fiscal  and  monetary  crunch,  the  price  stabilization
effort  and severe  external  shocks,  Chile's  GDP  dropped  12.9  percent  in  1975.
The  successful  fiscal  adjustment  was even  more  dramatic  if  one  considers  this
drop in  GDP.  Beginning  from  that  low  level  in 1975,  Chile  achieved  substan-
tial success,  as  GDP growth  reached  3.5  percent  in 1976  and  then  surpassed  8
percent  for  three  consecutive  years. Moreover,  inflation  was reduced  and  the
balance  of payments  crisis  had  been left  behind. Non-copper  exports  grew  at
31.7  percent  per  annum  between  1975  and  1979.9  Furthermore,  while  trade  was
being  liberalized  manufacturing  output  was growing  at 7.6  percent  per  year
over the  1975-79  period. The  average  annual  rate  of growth  of GDP reached
7.5  pexcent. This  performance  was largely  attributed  to  a "realistic'  real
exchange  rate (Graph  1),  the  opening  up of the  economy  to foreign  trade,  and
by the  dismantling  of  numerous  government  controls  across  all  markets.
An active  crawling  peg  policy,  with a decreasing  rate  of growth,  was
introduced  in February  1978. It  was later  replaced  in  June 1979  by a fixed
rate,  which  led  to the  beginning  of the  appreciation  of the  real  exchange
rate.
The  active  crawling  peg  policy  was the  main stabilization  device  and
induced  a  major  portfolio  adjustment  which resulted  in  major  capital  inflows.
In effect,  the  active  crawling  peg  amounted  to a devaluation  (at  a decreasing
rate)  substantially  below  the  previous  month's  inflation. Thus,  the  gap
between  domestic  interest  rates  (determined  mainly  in  a highly-distorted
9/  Using  the  USA  WPI  as deflator  for  the  value  of exports,  the  volume  of  non-
copper  exports  grew  19  percent  yearly.- 29 -
domestic  financial  market  with large  reserve  requirements)  and  the  expected
devaluation  --  augmented  foreign  interest  rates,  was  considerably  increased.
The  negative  international  real  interest  rates  contributed  to  even a  wider
spread.
The large  spread  between  domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates
triggered  large  capital  inflows.1 0 Capital  inflows  went from  $572  million  in
1977,  to $1,946  million  in 1978,  $2,248  million  in 1979,  $3,165  million  in
1980,  and  $4,769  million  in 1981. As a share  of  GDP  net  capital  inflows  grew
from  4.3  percent  of GDP in  1977  to 14.6  percent  of  GDP in  1981. (Corbo  1985b,
p. 896)
The increase  in  capital  inflows,  and  a drastic  reduction  in reserve
requirements  to reduce  the  taxation  of financial  intermediaries,  resulted  in
a large  monetary  expansion. Consequently,  this  pushed  the  domestic  interest
rates  down  and  supported  a large  expansion  in  absorption  that reached  an
average  annual  growth  rate  of 10.5  percent  per  year for  the  period  1979-81.
During  1979  and  1980  monetary  policy  was  very expansionary,  also  as a  result
of drastic  reduction  in reserve  requirements.  The  combination  of tight
fiscal  and  expansionary  monetary  policy  and large  capital  inflows  encouraged
a large  boom in private  expenditures,  especially  investment.  The  final
consequence  of the  unsustainable  increase  in  expenditures  was a large  erosion
in competitiveness,  a  very  weak commercial  account  in the  balance  of
payments,  and  heavy  external  borrowing. Indeed,  the  peso  appreciation  was a
second  and  more intensive  trade  liberaiization.
10/  Some  observers  (Edwards  and  Edwards,  1987,  and  Harberger,  1985)  attribute
most of the  increase  in capital  inflows  to the  lifting  of restrictions  to
these  inflows. However,  as indicated  in the  Appendix,  significant  restric-
tions  to capital  inflows  remained  until  1982. Furthermore,  the  large  spread
between  domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates  created  large  incentives  for
capital  inflows  and  pressures  on the  central  bank authorities  for  a lifting
of the  controls.- 30 -
By the  end  of 1981  Chile  was facing  an unsustainable  macroeconomic
situation. The  current  account  deficit  was close  to 15 percent  of GDP  and a
large  real  appreciation  was  jeopardizing  the  entire  liberalization  experi-
ment,  especially  the trade  liberalization  strategy.
The  new  external  shock  of 1982  in  the form  of a drastic  reduction  in
external  financing,  a large  increase  in international  interest  rates,  and  a
further  drop  in the  terms  of trade  forced  a drastic  macroeconomic  adjustment
that  was long  overdue.
This  change  in  macroeconomic  fundiamentals  required  a reduction  in
expenditures.  The  reduction  in expenditures  had to  be accompanied  by a much
depreciated  real  exchange  rate  to avoid  an increase  in  unemployment.  At
first,  the  government  tried  to achieve  both  objectives  by allowing  the  supply
of money  to  contract  following  the  drop  in foreign  reserves. In an  economy
with still  widespread  indexation,  the  monetary  contraction  did  not  help  much
in accomplishing  a real  devaluation  and instead  resulted  in a drastic
contraction  in production.  Not surprisingly,  the  unemployment  rate  increased
sharply  from  11 percent  in  March  1981  to  25 percent  in  June 1982,  in spite  of
massive  publiz  employment  programs  that  were 'employing'  another  6 percent  of
the labor  force. By the  middle  of 1982  the  orthodox  adjustment  program  was
abandoned,  wage indexation  was  eliminated,  and  a series  of  nominal  devalua-
tions  were introduced  to  produce  a large  real  devaluation. The  drastic
recession  of 1982,  and  the large  devaluation  initiated  in  the second  half  of
that  year  unveiled  a major  financial  crisis  that  resulted  in  the government's
intervention  of the  main  private  financial  institutions.  The renegotiation
of the  external  debt  followed  suit.
Between  1982  and  1987  the  real  devaluation  reached  117.3  percent.
After  the  large  recession  of 1982  and  a small  drop  in GDP  in 1983,  real  GDP- 31 -
growth  averaged  5.0  percent  per  year.  The  average  unemployment  rate  that  had
reacltd  22.1  percent  in 1982  had  been reduced  to 12.3  percent  by 1987. After
some  increase  in inflation  following  the  large  nominal  devaluation  of the
previous  years,  the rate  of inflation  slowed  down  to 19.9  percent  in 1987.
The  public  sector  deficit  was reduced  to 1.6  percent  of  GDP in 1987.
After  the initial  stages  of crisis  management,  which involved  some
reform  reversals  such  as an increase  in  tariffs  (Graph  2),  Chile  resumed  with
full  vigor  its  previous  policy  of export-oriented  growth. After  the  trau-
matic  experience  of 1982-84,  the  macroeconomic  policy  mix  aimed  at achieving
a real  exchange  rate  compatible  with  the  main  underlying  fundamentals  (terms
of trade,  interest  rates  and  resource  transfers. To accomplish  this,  since
the  end  of 1982  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  have  been  moderate  and  the  peso
has  been devalued  daily  in order  to achieve  a  much depreciated  real  exchange
compatible  with the  ctsnges  in  fundamentals  (Fontaine  1987).
As a response  to the  resulting  real  devaluation,  there  has been  a
drastic  increase  in  private  and  public  savings,  and  an increase  in  private
and  public  investment,  non-copper  exports  reached  an average  yearly  growth  of
10  percent  in real  terms  over the  period  1984-87,  GDP a growth  rate  of 5.0
percent,  and the  unemployment  rate  dropping  to 12.3  percent  (Table  1).
Finally,  the  net resource  transfer  was reduced  from  a  net inflow  of 12.9
percent  of  GDP in 1981,  to a  net  outflow  of 4.9  percent  of  GDP in 1987 (Table
5).  Thus,  the  turn  around  in  net resource  transfers  was  an astonishing  17.8
percentage  points  of GDP.- 32 -
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
Four  main conclusions  can  be drawn  from  Chile's  experience. First,
the  liberalizati-n  and  stabilization  reforms  implemented  during  the  early
years  of the  military  government,  in spite  of the  unfavorable  external  shocks
of 1975,  succeeded  until  late  1978,  in slowing  down inflation,  reducing
sharply  net transfers  and  recovering  growth. 11 Furthermore,  as this
adjustment  was taking  place  the  debt to  GDP ratio  was almost  constant  over
the  1974-79  period  (Table  5, column  4).
Second,  the  reduction  of a large  public  sector  deficit  required
strong  actions,  both  on the  expenditure  and revenue  side.  The  introduction
of a value  added  tax,  and  the  adjustment  in the  tariffs  of public  utilities
to reflect  opportunity  costs,  made  major  contributions  to the  reduction  of
the  deficit. Structural  reforms  in  the  entire  tax  system  were important  in
reducing  the  distortionary  effects  of the  tax  regime.
Third,  the  elimination  of a large  public  sector  deficit  is  a neces-
sary  but  not sufficient  condition  for  the  control  of inflation. Indeed,  as
the  recent  literature  has shown,  inertial  inflation  can  make inflation  reduc-
tion  without  income  policies  a slow  and  costly  process  (Kiguel  and  Liviatan,
1988). The  second  stabilization  attempt,  undertaken  when inflation  was down
to 35 percent a year --  a level similar to the average for t.he  1960s --
worked  at cross-purposes  with the  export-led  growth  being  generated  by the
liberalization  of trade. Indeed,  the  use  of the  exchange  rate  to stabilize  a
widely  indebted  economy  created  not only  a temporal  short-term  real
appreciation  of the  peso,  it also  encouraged  external  borrowing  at a time
11/  Of course,  part of the  favorable  growth  is  due to the  low  base following  the
1975  recession,  but  one  also  needs  to take  into  account  the sharp  drop  in
terms  of trade.- 33 -
when the  restrictions  on capital  inflows  were being  lifted  and  international
capital  markets  were very liquid. The  large  rise  in expenditures  that
followed  the  decrease  in the  interest  rate  and  the  increase  in  capital  inflow
caused  the  peso to appreciate  further. The  result  was an  unsustainable
current  account  deficit  that  ran  close  to 25 percent  of  GDP in the  first  half
of 1981.  The  appreciation  squeezed  tradables  just  when exporters  were  making
inroads  into  world  markets  and  when firms  in  the import-competing  sector  had
completed  a  major  adjustment  to the  trade  liberalization.  Not surprisingly,
firms  in the  tradable  sectors  suffered  a large  squeeze  on  profits  (Corbo  and
Sanchez,  1985;  Galvez  and  Tybout,  1985).
Fourth,  once  the  macroeconomic  miatakes  of the  late-1970s  and early-
1980s  were corrected,  Chile  recovered  its  growth  and  reduced  inflation. This
was achieved  in spite  of a drastic  reduction  in  the  net transfer  of resources
received  from  the  rest  of the  world  and  unfavorable  terms  of trade.-L  06C  D10A_
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Mt  Sales  otf aode
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miit  Trasfrs
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gbt  Camiftel  tavern  4-3.57  4.00  -2.96  -2.35  0.46  -0.65  0.19  -1.25  -0.47  0.t7  0.21  0.86  2.11  1.7  1.05  O.64
C-ital  formilan  10.41  10.46  9.64  6.35  12.34  9.15  6.09  6.90  6."  5.10  5.24  5.06  4.67  4.76  6.00  7.07
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imrzsc: Lorrain  (1966).mi  w  Tff  wmsw.  1a0_
uoremt  of  a
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Teas  2S.50  21.1  231.60  20.J7  21.5D  27.00  21.94  26.62  29.60  25.71  25.26  22.11  2244  21.76  5.17
Diret  Taxe  7.75  6.19  4.21  5."  7.19  9.59  9.58  7.79  6.09  7.16  7.26  5.71  5.71  4.691  4.65  8."
Persoa.l  ad  buesine  incomer  8.2  4.0  3.62  4.76  4.75  5.65  4.16  4.31  4.29  4.45  5.2  5.40  4.59  1.16  8.16  1.96
Copr  ceni_  8.10  O.J6  0.0  0.86  1.78  1.26  2.68  2.J1  2.61  1.94  1.66  0.24  O."  1.69  1.2:  0.84
Prerv  0.61  1.01  0.71  0.87  0.91  2.65  2.00  1.09  1.0  0.7°  0.1  8  0.22  0.18  0.14  0.QU  0.18
nDirect  Tom:  10.6  11.65  11.18  10.12  18.92  14.60  14.00  14.90  18.72  1u.20  18.48  14.75  18.7?  14.64  14.10  17.06
ode  mad  we"vlcoo  9.11  9.66  9.66  O.69  9.17  11.68  12.16  12.86  12.49  11.u0  12.29  18.19  18.6  18.6  14.10  1.06
RIbermmtim lt.md  1.71  1.6  1.61  0.44  1.97  2.95  1.67  2.85  1.41  2.02  1.46  2.27  1.46  1.84  8.29  .64
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the-Tm, Rn....  6.07  6.4  5.65  8.1  6.76  7.81  10.34  12.06  7.74  6.73  6."  6.60  7.  5.29  4.461  8.4
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burnIg.  31.12  0.7.  0.25  2.11  4.06  2.65  1.10  1."  1.20  O.-  U  0.  14  0.14  0.  0.  ..  a.
inrbizatim  -1.19  -1.2  -0.84  -1.#8  -4.41  4."6  -4.44  -2.17  -1.  -1..6  40.4  -0.67  4O.a  -0.74  . *-
1.4mB  01)  .8  10.36  14.10  11.81  7.06  5.47  0.00  4.01  -4.70  -4.17  -4.78  4.86  2.4  5.1  1.77  0.60
baking  ftet"  5.14  12.4S  14.42  10.21  5.  2.0  1.:  -O.6  -1.U4  4.70  4.4  -2.12  2.76  21.0  n.e  a.-
_0kw  dia  rneaul  0.48  -2.10  4.25  4.65  O.6  0.6  -0.4a  0.6S  40.4  0.4S  -1.2  -0.27  -O.U5  40.8  *.  u.s
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~~:  bigni  Office.  NIaIa44p of  Macace~~~~~~Table  4
FUWICIIU 1ICAIS
Errors
Capital  Current  Chang" In  and  Chbngs  Changs  Resl  Adjustable  Real
Account  Account  Reserv  Omissions  in  MI  In  k2  Intrest  Interest  Llbor  Ml/UDP  M2/UP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (C)  (7)  ts)  (9)  (10)  (11)
(in  percent  of  PW)  (itn  percent)
1069  2.7  -0.1  2.1  -0.6  40.2  40.2  *.7  6.0  14.2  14.5
1970  3.2  -1.0  1.3  -0.9  51.6  50.$  9.2  15.0  16.2
1971  0.4  -1.6  -2.2  -0.6  90.6  944.  -12.5  28.1  23.0
1972  3.6  -3.1  -0.7  -1.4  96.0  91.3  -23.0  24.5  23.3
1973  4.8  -2.8  0.9  -0.6  272.1  265.6  *.7  16.7  16.7
1074  1.6  -1.9  -0.7  -0.6  259.8  306.6  39.6  8.4  9.5
1975  5.0  -6.6  -3.1  -1.3  249.1  296.5  10.0  32.6  7.6  9.6
1970  0.2  1.5  2.4  0.7  196.3  274.0  64.3  -16.7  6.2  10.1
1977  4.7  -4.1  1.2  0.7  116.9  16.1  56.6  -17.6  6.0  11.9
1978  18.1  -7.1  5.1  -0.9  78.4  117.6  42.2  7.5  6.1  1s.O
1979  11.6  -5.7  6.1  -0.1  69.5  74..  16.6  22.9  -8.4  6.2  16.6
1060  18.4  -7.1  6.4  0.2  59.4  U.  11.9  15.8  -11.6  7.1  16.6
1961  z  .8  -14.5  -0.9  0.3  6.7  3.6  36.7  14.5  -2.5  6.5  24.2
1662  4.9  -9.5  -4.9  0.3  -9.0  4.1  35.1  16.9  34.7  6.1  26.9
196  2.5  -5.0  -2.6  0.3  26.6  -9.6  16.5  10.0  83.6  6.1  25.9
1964  10.4  -10.7  0.2  0.5  7.6  31.4  11.7  9.0  15.9  5.4  20.1
1065  7.9  -6.3  -1.2  -0.7  26.3  36.1  11.5  9.4  35.7  *.1  20.4
1966  6.3  -6.5  -0.5  -0.3  44.1  24.7  6.4  7.6  7.1  5.6  20.2
1967  6.5  -4.6  0.6  -1.2  7.6  44.6  9.6  7.3  1.6  5.0  23.0
(1)  * (3)-(2)-(4)
(3)  Correspeeds  to  the  change  In  the  stock  of  reerves  of  the  Cntral  Bank  deftned  as asets less  m  of  IMF  credit.
Col_mns  (5)  and  (6)  were  constructed  based  on  an  average  holdings  varitions  bet  n  end-of-yeer  months.
Until  1979 the  sorce Is  Boran,  C.  (106),  Estedlstic  trTestreesO  de  producto  y  dinero  pra Isa  economics  chiTlns:  196041.U.  do  Chile.
From  1900, SlntesiT  Monetaria and Inform  Economics  y  FinancerT,  Banco Central  do Chile..
(7)  Corresponds to  the  expost  real  interet  rate  for  on month  loans;  from  1975 until  1692 bank rates;  from  1903  average  of  the  f*inncial  systom.
(8)  Indexed intsres  rates  charged for  three-months to  one-year  operations.
(9)  Corresponds to  the  LIMR  for  six  months  operations  expresed  In  real  terms.
Source:  indicadores  economics y sociales  1900-1965,  sintesis  monetria,  informs  conomics  y  financieran  Banco  Central  do  Chile.- 39 -
Table  S
SELECTED  EXTERNAL  INDICATORS
Non-Copper  Private  Public  Debt  Resource
Exports  Debt 2 '  Debt  31  Ratio 4 '  Balance 5 t
(million  of  (millions  of  US$)  (percentage
1987  US$)'/  of GDP)
1960  480.1  222  400  14.5  -8.2
1961  518.8  330  465  16.6  -9.6
1962  550.0  426  563  17.4  -7.2
1963  533.1  448  700  26.4  -6.6
1964  747.0  484  815  19.8  -7.4
1965  813.4  499  970  24.0  -7.0
1966  823.7  539  1,058  24.3  -12.2
1967  686.2  536  1,236  26.0  -9.3
1968  678.7  634  1,456  30.9  -10.6
1969  714.3  770  1,777  33.4  -12.8
1970  758.0  549  2,218  33.7  -12.5
1971  803.1  441  2,305  25.9  -13.3
1972  596.4  413  2,589  24.3  -15.9
1973  594.2  399  2,862  31.6  -15.1
1974  1,011.7  443  3.583  36.4  -11.3
1975  1,267.1  670  3,597  59.1  -1.2
1976  1,481.9  799  3,475  43.S  2.1
1977  1,619.7  990  3,520  33.8  -1.8
1978  1,822.4  1,570  4,353  38.5  -3.2
1979  2,539.8  2,736  4,771  36.2  -5.2
1980  2,951.2  4,693  4,720  34.1  -6.7
1981  2,200.6  8,138  4,415  38.5  -12.9
1982  2,076.0  8,658  5,157  56.8  0.2
1983  1,984.9  8,143  6,689  75.0  4.1
1984  2,026.5  6,362  10,601  88.2  2.2
1985  2,005.8  5,479  12,161  110.1  6.4
1986  2,505.3  4,826  12,942  105.6  6.6
1987  2,900.5  2,627  14,725  92.6  4.9
1/  Deflated  by the  USA  WPI.
2/  Includes  only  medium-  and long-term  external  debt.
31  Includes  only  medium-  and  long-term  external  debt.
41  In order  to express  total  external  debt  to  current  pesos,  the  average
nominal  exchange  rate  of the  banking  system  vas  used.
5/  Measured  with national  account  information  at  constant  prices.GRAPH 1



























Commercial  Policy 2
September  1973 (pre-reform  situation): Quantitative  restrictions
were widespread.  Tariffs  ranged  from 0 percent  to 750  percent.  with a mean
value (weighted  by the  number  of tariff  positions)  of 105  percent,  a mode of
90  percent  and a  median of 80 percent.  There  were 2,872 tariff  positions
subject  to an import  deposit  of 10,000  percent  of the  CIF value.
September  1973-July  1975:  The  highest  nominal  tariff  was reduced
from  750  percent  to 140 percent  and then to 120  percent.  The  mean  weighted
tariff  was reduced  from  105  percent  to 57 percent.
August 1975-November  1977:  A  tariff  goal  was defined  with six
nominal levels  between  10  percent  and 35  percent,  to  be enacted  in the first
quarter  of 1978.  This structure  was reached  in  August  1977  because  of an
anticipation  of the last  two stages. During this  period  the  highest  nominal
tariff  dropped  from 120  percent  to 35  percent (except  for  the  motorcar
industry)  and the  mean  weighted  tariff  from  44 percent  to 19.7  percent.
December  1977 onwards:  In  December  1977  a target structure  was
established  with a 10  percent  uniform  tax to  be reached  in  June 1979.  The
target  was reached  gradually  by  means of small  monthly  adjustments. In this
period  the  mean weighted  tariff  went from  19.7  percent  to 10.1  percent.
Complementary  aspects  of the  reforms: All tariff  exemptions  were
eliminated.  First,  the  public  sector  was subjected  to the  general  regime  as
early as 1974.  Consumption  surcharge  taxes  that imposed  a  higher rate  on
imports  than on domestically  produced  competing  goods  were eliminated. By
September  1976,  prior  deposit  requirements  on imports  except  cars  and used  or
damaged  merchandise  were eliminated,  and the list  of allowed  import  items  was
replaced  by a short  list  of forbidden  items.  Finally,  in  August  1981 the list
of forbidden  items  was eliminated.
Price Liberalization 3
September  1973 (pre-reform  situation): More than 3,000  prices  were
fixed  by DIRINCO (under  the  Commerce  Department,  a part  of the  Ministry  of the
Economy).
1/ This  appendix  is from  Corbo (1985b).
2/ For  a good  description  of the  commercial  policies  during  this  period, see
Torres (1082).
3/ Based on  Wisecarver (1985).- 43  -
October  1973: Law  decree  522  defined  three  groups  of good.  and
services: those  whose  prices  were to be freely  determined  (the  majority);
those  whose  prices  would  continue  to be fixed  by DIRINCO  (by  means  of cost
studies)  (33  goods  and  services);  and  a group  of 18 goods  whose  prices  were to
be reported  to DIRINCO,  even  though  they  were to  be freely  determined.
October  1973-May  1982:  The  general  tendency  was toward  price
liberalization.  In December  1980.  law  decree  3529  was enacted  forbidding
items  in the reported  price  category  from  being  reclassified  as fixed  price
goods  and  those  freely  priced  ones  to  be put either  under  the  reported  price
category  or the fixed  price  category.
Labor
September  1973 (pre-reform  situation):  The following  items  were
legally  included  in individual  contracts: work  hours (normal  and  overtime
pay),  work conditions,  length  of  vacation,  salary  (at  least  the  minimum)  and
so  on.  In  addition,  a lump  sum  payment  for  each  year  of  work  made labor
dismissal  extremely  difficult  and  expensive.
1974  onwards: Discriminatory  benefits  were slowly  eliminated;  family
allowances  and retirement  ages  were  made  uniform  for  blue-collar  and  white-
collar  workers.  Social  security  contributions  were slowly  reduced. Uaion
power  was heavily  reduced.
1978  and  1981:  Efforts  were  made to  permit  greater  bargaining  flex-
ibility  for  vacations,  indemnizations  and  profit-sharing.  Further,  employers
were  allowed  to lay-off  workers  without  justification.  Minimum  wage  market
coverage  was reduced.
July 1979: A 'Labor  Planl  was enacted. This  plan reintroduced  col-
lective  bargaining  for  a fraction  of the  labor  force. In  contract  bargaining,
the  lowest  offer  that  employers  could  make  had to  be equal  to the  previous
wage adjusted  by the  CPI.
External  Capital  Markets 4
The  reforms  in the  capital  market were too  numerous  and  in the
initial  stage-lacked  clear  direction. Among  the  main reforms  were the
following.
September  1977:  Commercial  banks  were allowed  to become  indebted
under  Article  14  of the  exchange  law. 5 A monthly  minimum  limit  of 5  percent
of capital  and reserves  was imposed  for  flows  under  this  type  of operation.
4/ Extracted  from  Gutierrez  (1982)  and  Rosende  (1981).
51 Article  14 refers  to the  permission  given  by the  Central  Bank  to a borrower
for  future  access  to the  exchange  rate  market  to service  a foreign  debt.- 44  -
January  1978:  The  Central  Bank  established  a  stock  limit  of 25  per-
cent  of capital  and reserves  for  debt  under  Article  14.
March  1978, The stock  limit  was raised  to 160  percent  of the  capital
plus reserves  of commercial  banks.
April  1978:  The  global  limit  was raised  to 180  percent  and  a sub-
limit  of 160  percent  was set  for  debt  with a  mean amortization  of 36  months  or
lower. The  Article  14 limits  were raised  to 45 percent  and  25  percent  for
debt  of the  above  types. This  credit  had  to be channeled  toward  dollar-
denominated  debt.  For  the  first  time,  a limit  on external  debt  was imposed  on
development  banks. This limit  was 400  percent  of capital  and  reserves,  or 500
percent  if the  excess  over  the  400  percent  was covered  by credits  with a
maturity  of 36  months  and  over.
December  1978: The  global  limit  and  sublimit  were raised  to 180  per-
cent  and  215  percent  for  commercial  banks  and  to 400  percent  and  600  percent
for  development  banks. The limit  under  Article  14  was raised  from  45 percent
to 60  percent.
April  1979: The sublimit  of 215  percent  wAs raised  to 225  percent
for  commercial  banks.  the  Article  14 limit  from  60  percent  to 70  percent. A
variable  reserve  requirement  was established  for  external  credits  depending  on
the  length  of  maturity  of the loans: 10 percent  for  those  with a maturity  of
48 to 66  months,  15  percent  for  those  of 36 to 48  months,  and  25  percent  for
those  of 24 to 36  months.
June 1979: The global  limits  on external  borrowing  were  eliminated.
From  this  moment  on.  the  only  limitation  on bank  indebtedness  was the  lawful
internal  limit  on total  debt:  20 times  capital  and  reserves. Debt limits
under  Article  14  were eliminated.  The  monthly  limits  under  Article  14  were
maintained,  but  reduced  to 5  percent  of  capital  and  reserves  or $1  million,
whichever  was greater.
April  1980: All  monthly  limits  under  Article  14  were lifted.
September  1980: Commercial  banks  were  allowed  to lend  in  external
markets  using  their  own  resources.
December  1981:  For  the first  time,  commercial  banks  were allowed  to
lend  short  term (180  days)  with external  credit  for  purposes  other  than
financing  commercial  operations.
May 1982: Commercial  banks  were allowed  to  obtain  external  credit
with a  maturity  under  two  years  subject  to a reserve  requirement  of 20
percent.
July  1982: Commercial  banks  were allowed  to use  part of their  short-
run  foreign  credits  to lend  in  pesos,  with a limit  of 50 percent  of capital
and  reserves.- 45  -
Domestic  Financial  Markets 6
a)  Interest  Rates
Pre-reform: Nominal  interest  rates  were fixed  by the  Cantral  Bank.
As the resulting  real  interest  rates  were  highly  negative,  most credit  was
allocated  by quotas.
MLi1 9 74 :  Law  Decree  455  modified  the  interest  rate  concept  to the
quantity  that the  creditor  received  and  that  exceeded  the  capital  value
properly  adjusted  by inflation. In the same  law  decree,  free  bargaining  of
the interest  rate  was established,  subject  to the  restriction  that  it  not
exceed  50  percent  of the  current  interest  rate  for  inflation-adjustable
operations  and  non-adjustable  operations,  whichever  the  case.
September  and  October  1974:  Commercial  banks  were allowed  by the
Central  Bank to  determine  freely  the interest  rate  for  deposits  with a
maturity  longer  than  60  days,  a maturity  that  was later  lowered  to 30 days.
June 1975: The  Central  Bank  allowed  commercial  banks  and  the  Banco
del  Estado  to  determine  freely  the interest  rate  on  botb inilation-adjustable
operations  and  non-inflation-adjustable  operations.
b)  Operational  and  Institutional  Aspects
December  19732  Establishment  of  new  banks  was prohibited  until
December  1974.  To relax  this  limitation,  the  so-called  'operative  represen-
tation  of foreign  banks'  was created,  but these  entities  could  not operate  in
the  domestic  deposit  market  nor  extend  domestic  currency  credits.
December  1974:  Rules  were established  with respect  to the  organiza-
tion  and  functioning  of financial  institutions,  which  were to be corporations
with the  sole  social  objective  of acting  as financial  intermediaries.  Minimum
capital  limits  were established  together  with specifications  of operations
that  were allowed  or  not  allowed. Limits  on investments  and credits  to the
same  natural  or legal  entity  were imposed. The  banking  law  was modified,  so
that  no natural  entity  could  own  more  than  a 1-1/2  percent  of the  capital  of a
bank,  a limit  that  was raised  to 3  percent  if  the  entity  was a legal  one.  For
new  banks,  this  limit  would  be enforced  five  years  after  operations  started.
Commercial,  development  and  mortgage  banks  were not  allowed  to  have shares  of
small  financial  institutions.  Foreign  banks  were  permitted  to  establish
branches  and  offices  in Chile.
January  1976:  A  law  concerning  the  management  of Investment  Fund
Societies  (Fondos  Mutuos)  regulated  which investment  instruments  could  be
bought,  such  as  corporate  shares,  bonds,  debentures,  IOUs,  government  debt  and
other  debt. Minimum  capital  requirements  were raised,  regulatory  provisions
were established,  and  all  types  of debt instruments  were enlarged.
6/ Based  on 'Evolucion  de las  principales  normas  que  regulan  el  mercado
financiero  chileno,  Septiembre  1973  - JunWo  1980",  Banco  Central  de Chile,
1981.- 46  -
Foreign  Exchange  Policy 7
September  1973 (pre-reform  situation):  There  were  multiple  exchange
rates,  parallel  exchange  markets  and  a large  overvaluation  of the  peso.
October  1973:  There  was a  maxi-devaluation,  and  the  exchange  markets
were reduced  to three.
August  1974*  The  special  exchange  rate  for  copper  exports  was  elimi-
nated.  The spot  market  dollar  initially  suffered  two  devaluations  and later
another  15.  The  average  rate  of devaluation  for  the  year  was 6.1  percent.
The  total  annual  devaluation  in  this  market  was 166.7  percent. In the  banking
market,  24 devaluations  were  made  during  the  year;  the  result  was an average
devaluation  rate  of 6.9  percent,  with  an annual  rate  of 392.1  percent.
1975:  The  exchange  rate  policy  consisted  of small  periodic
devaluations.
June  1976: A  10 percent  revaluation  was effected.
August  1976: An exchange  rate  system  with  one rate  was reached.
March  1977: A 10  percent  revaluation  was effected.
December  1977:  The  government  announced  that  the  devaluation  rate
would  exceed  the  inflation  rate  to  compensate  for  the  tariff  reductions.
February  1978: A  formal  tablita  consisting  of devaluations  at a
decreasing  rate  was established. This  one lasted  until  June  1979.
June  1979:  The  exchange  rate  was fixed  at the rate  progranmmed  for
December  1979 in  the  later  tablita,  with the  concurrent  announcement  that  this
fixing  would last  until  February  1980.
December  1979:  The  fixed  rate  was extended  indefinitely.
June  1979-June  1982: An 18  percent  devaluation  ended  with the  fixed
rate  period. The  new  system  consisted  of one in  which  the  peso  was pegged  to
a basket  of foreign  currencies.
August  198,:  The  floating  rate  policy  was enforced.
September  1982: A new tablita,  with  monthly  devaluations  equivalent
to the  previous  month's  inflation  rate  minus  1  percent,  was announced. Access
to the  exchange  market  was severely  restricted.
7/  Ffrench-Davis  (1979)  and  Meza (1981).- 47  -
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